International Journal of Game Theory is devoted to game theory and its applications. It publishes original research making significant contributions from a methodological, conceptual or mathematical point of view. Survey articles may also be considered if especially useful for the field.
On random stable partitions
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/s00182-018-0635-9
General distribution of consumers in pure Hotelling games
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/s00182-018-0648-4
A generalization of Arc-Kayles
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/s00182-018-0639-5
Equivalences among five game specifications, including a new specification whose nodes are sets of past choices
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-018-0652-8
Lies and consequences
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-019-00679-Z
Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-019-00659-3
Compromises and Rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-018-0622-1
Cooperation and endogenous repetition in an infinitely repeated social dilemma
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-019-00663-7
Weakly differentially monotonic solutions for cooperative games
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-019-00669-1
Dynamic matching pennies on networks
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-019-00665-5
Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-019-00680-6
An epistemic approach to stochastic games
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-018-0644-8
Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-019-00661-9
Equilibrium payoffs in repeated two-player zero-sum games of finite automata
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-018-0634-X
An equitable Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-019-00658-4
Multiplayer games as extension of misère games
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-019-00662-8
Rationalizability in multicriteria games
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-018-0655-5
Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-018-00656-Y
An analysis of dual-issue final-offer arbitration
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/s00182-018-0653-7
Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-018-0643-9
Paths to stable allocations
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-019-00664-6
Bankruptcy problems with reference-dependent preferences
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/s00182-018-0647-5
Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-019-00689-X
Matching with restricted trade
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-019-00667-3
On the equal treatment imputations subset in the bargaining set for smooth vector-measure games with a mixed measure space of players
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-018-0632-Z
Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-018-0637-7
PSPACE-complete two-color planar placement games
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-018-0628-8
Catch games: the impact of modeling decisions
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-018-0640-Z
Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-018-0641-Y
Strategic information transmission despite conflict
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-019-00668-2
Limited focus in dynamic games
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/s00182-018-0642-x
My scientific first-born: a clarification
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-019-00671-7
Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/s00182-018-0649-3
Composition independence in compound games: a characterization of the Banzhaf power index and the Banzhaf value
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-019-00660-W
The effects of third-party transfers in sequential anchored bargaining
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-018-00657-X
Majority judgment and strategy-proofness: a characterization
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-019-00666-4
Simultaneous but independent ultimatum game: strategic elasticity or social motive dependency?
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-018-0646-6
Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-018-0625-Y
Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-019-00677-1
Self-recognition in teams
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/s00182-019-00683-3
On the ordinal equivalence of the Jonhston, Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-018-0650-X
The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-018-0651-9
Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-018-0654-6
Robust multiplicity with (transfinitely) vanishing naiveté
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-019-00670-8
Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers
来源期刊：International Journal of Game TheoryDOI：10.1007/S00182-019-00685-1
