ECONOMIC THEORY

ECONOMIC THEORY

ECON THEOR
影响因子:1.1
是否综述期刊:
是否预警:不在预警名单内
是否OA:
出版国家/地区:
出版社:Springer Nature
发刊时间:0
发刊频率:8 issues per year
收录数据库:Scopus收录
ISSN:0938-2259

期刊介绍

The purpose of Economic Theory is to provide an outlet for research - in all areas of economics based on rigorous theoretical reasoning, and - on specific topics in mathematics which is motivated by the analysis of economic problems. Economic Theory's scope encompasses - but is not limited to - the following fields. - classical and modern equilibrium theory - cooperative and non-cooperative game theory - macroeconomics - social choice and welfare - uncertainty and information, intertemporal economics (including dynamical systems) - public economics - international and developmental economics - financial economics, money and banking - industrial organization Economic Theory also publishes surveys if they clearly picture the basic ideas at work in some areas, the essential technical apparatus which is used and the central questions which remain open. The development of a productive dialectic between stylized facts and abstract formulations requires that economic relevance be at the forefront. Thus, correct, and innovative, mathematical analysis is not enough; it must be motivated by - and contribute to - the understanding of substantive economic problems. Officially cited as: Econ Theory
经济理论的目的是提供一个出口的研究-在所有领域的经济学基于严格的理论推理,并在数学的具体主题,这是由经济问题的分析的动机。经济理论的范围包括但不限于以下领域。-古典和现代均衡理论-合作和非合作博弈论-宏观经济学-社会选择和福利-不确定性和信息,跨期经济学(包括动力系统)-公共经济学-国际和发展经济学-金融经济学,货币和银行-产业组织经济理论也出版调查,如果他们清楚地描绘了在一些领域工作的基本思想,所使用的基本技术设备和仍待解决的中心问题。在程式化的事实和抽象的表述之间发展一种富有成效的辩证法,需要把经济相关性放在首位。由此可见,正确、创新、数学分析是不够的;它必须以理解实质性经济问题为动力,并有助于理解实质性经济问题。正式引用为:经济理论
年发文量 83
国人发稿量 9.37
国人发文占比 0.11%
自引率 -
平均录取率-
平均审稿周期 -
版面费 US$2890
偏重研究方向 ECONOMICS-
期刊官网 https://www.springer.com/199
投稿链接 https://www.editorialmanager.com/ECTH

期刊高被引文献

Competitive disclosure of correlated information
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-018-01171-7
Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-018-1101-4
A revealed reference point for prospect theory
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-017-1096-2
Rationalizability and learning in games with strategic heterogeneity
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-017-1092-6
Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-018-1142-8
On maximin dynamic programming and the rate of discount
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-018-1166-0
Discrimination through versioning with advertising in social networks
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-018-1107-Y
Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-017-1090-8
Super- and submodularity of stopping games with random observations
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-019-01198-4
A qualitative theory of large games with strategic complementarities
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-017-1075-7
Asymptotic properties of welfare relations
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-018-1100-5
Comparative statics and heterogeneity
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-018-1116-X
Banking competition, production externalities, and the effects of monetary policy
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-017-1086-4
Complementary Monopolies with asymmetric information
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/s00199-019-01197-5
A Becker–Tomes model with investment risk
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-018-1103-2
Heterogeneity, monetary policy, Mirrleesian taxes, and the Friedman rule
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-018-1108-X
Skill premium divergence: the roles of trade, capital and demographics
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-018-1098-8
On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/s00199-018-1124-x
A general model of price competition with soft capacity constraints
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-019-01203-W
The effect of meeting rates on matching outcomes
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-018-1113-0
Robust mechanisms: the curvature case
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-018-1120-1
Oligopoly with network effects: firm-specific versus single network
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/s00199-019-01229-0
Bequests, estate taxes, and wealth distributions
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-017-1091-7
Real transfers and the Friedman rule
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-018-1105-0
Well-being measurement with non-classical goods
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-018-1143-7
Synchronized matching with incomplete information
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-018-1127-7
Supermodularity and Complementarity in Economic Theory
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-019-01196-6
All-pay auctions with ties
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-019-01195-7
Fair social decision under uncertainty and belief disagreements
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-017-1097-1
Contests with Dominant Strategies
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/s00199-019-01226-3
Decision making within a product network
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/s00199-019-01238-z
Equilibrium in quality markets, beyond the transferable case
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-018-1118-8
Consequentialism and dynamic consistency in updating ambiguous beliefs
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-018-1121-0
A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/s00199-019-01224-5
Job search under asymmetric information: endogenous wage dispersion and unemployment stigma
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-018-1099-7
Convergence within binary market scoring rules
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-018-1155-3
Individual upper semicontinuity and subgame perfect $$\\epsilon $$ϵ-equilibria in games with almost perfect information
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.26481/UMAGSB.2019002
Evolutionary stability in the generalized second-price auction
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/s00199-019-01240-5
Individual upper semicontinuity and subgame perfect $$\\epsilon $$-equilibria in games with almost perfect information
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-019-01201-Y
Full and constrained Pareto efficiency with incomplete financial markets
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/s00199-019-01239-y
Climate policy: How to deal with ambiguity?
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-020-01284-Y
Fairness and utilitarianism without independence
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-017-1093-5
Sorting in iterated incumbency contests
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/s00199-019-01205-8
Capital accumulation game with quasi-geometric discounting and consumption externalities
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-019-01243-2
Channeling the final say in politics: a simple mechanism
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/s00199-019-01236-1
Motivating informed decisions
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/s00199-017-1087-3
A marriage matching function with flexible spillover and substitution patterns
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/s00199-018-1148-2
On the empirical content of the Beckerian marriage model
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/s00199-018-1106-z
Information transmission and voting
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-019-01191-X
On the Optimality of Monetary Trading
来源期刊:Economic TheoryDOI:10.1007/S00199-019-01219-2

质量指标占比

研究类文章占比 OA被引用占比 撤稿占比 出版后修正文章占比
100.00%37.5%-0.7%

相关指数

影响因子
影响因子
年发文量
自引率
Cite Score

预警情况

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时间 预警情况
2025年03月发布的2025版不在预警名单中
2024年02月发布的2024版不在预警名单中
2023年01月发布的2023版不在预警名单中
2021年12月发布的2021版不在预警名单中
2020年12月发布的2020版不在预警名单中
*来源:中科院《 国际期刊预警名单》

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ECONOMICS
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版本 大类学科 小类学科 Top期刊 综述期刊
2025年3月最新升级版
经济学3区
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2023年12月升级版
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2022年12月旧的升级版
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